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POWERS OF CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
POWERS OF CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION
COMMITTEES
By CHARLES LORING*
T HE recent Congressional investigations and particularly those
conducted by committees of the Senate, have raised the ques-
tion- as to the power of those committees to compel the attendance
of witnesses and the production of papers, and to punish non-
attendance, refusal to testify, or the non-production of papers.
Is there an unlimited power vested in Congress, in either house
thereof or its authorized committees, to investigate any subject
whatever and to compel testimony with reference thereto?
The limits to the powers of such Congressional committees
and- of the Houses of Congress have been well defined by the
courts and particularly by the Supreme Court of the United
States. That there may be limits to such investigation has ap-
parently occurred to members of both Houses, as witness Sena-
tor Walsh's brief incorporated in the Congressional Record of
March 24, 1924.'
".. . It is a limited power and should be kept within its proper
bounds, and when these are exceeded a jurisdictional question is
presented which is cognizable in the courts ... w12
And the brief of Mr. Wood likewise incorporated in that Record
on April 1, 1924.1
When the powers of these committees were first presented
to the courts the contention was made that the right of investi-
gation was unlimited and that the power to compel the attendance
of witnesses and to elicit their testimony was likewise unlimited,
and in case of a contumacious witness, the authority to punish
for contempt -was also unlimited. It was contended that this
power was inherent in the legislative body and was analogous to
the powers possessed by the English Parliament. In the case of
Kilbourn v. Thompson,4 the court carefully distinguishes between
*Lieutenant-Colonel, Judge Advocate, U. S. A.; member of the Crook-
ston, Minnesota, Bar.1Congressional Record, 68th Cong., 1st session, page 4966.21bid, page 4968.31bid, at page 5539.
4(1880) 103 U. S. 168, 26 L. Ed. 377.
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the powers of the houses of Congress and those of the English
Parliament. It reviews the English cases and comes to the con-
clusion that the power to punish for contempt which lies in the
British Parliament arises from the fact that Parliament, as it
originally existed, was a court which exercised judicial func-
tions. In fact, Parliament originally consisted of the bishops,
the lords, the knights and burgesses who, when assembled, were
called the "High Court of Parliament." This body not only en-
acted laws, but rendered judgments in matters of private right
which when approved by the King were valid and binding. After
the expansion of Parliament into the House of Lords and the
House of Commons, the judicial function of reviewing decisions
of the courts passed to the House of Lords and the power of
impeachment, and perhaps other powers of judicial character,
went to the House of Commons; and the two houses jointly re-
tained the power for a long time of passing bills of attainder for
treason and other high crimes.
It was early claimed that the legislative assemblies of the
British dependencies had the same parliamentary rights and privi-
leges which we have seen belonged to the English Parliament
and that power to punish for contempt of its authority was a
necessary incident to every body exercising legislative functions.
The first case to come before the Privy Council was that of the
Legislative Assembly of Newfoundland, where it was held that
such power to punish for contempt was not inherent in the local
legislature as being reasonably necessary for the exercise of its
functions and duties and the distinction between that assembly
and the House of Commons was carefully made out upon the
ground that the House of Commons had such power not because
of its legislative functions, but by virtue of "ancient usage and
prescription." The Newfoundland case was followed later by the
cases of Fenton v. Hampton,5 and Doyle v. Falconer.6
The United States Supreme Court in the Kilbourn Case said :7
"We are of opinion that the right of the House of Represen-
tatives to punish the citizen for a contempt of its authority or a
breach of its privileges can derive no support from the prece-
dents and practices of the two Houses of the English Parliament,
nor from the adjudged cases in which the English courts have
upheld these practices. Nor taking what has fallen from the
English judges, and especially the later cases on which we have
5(1858) 11 Moore, P. C. 347.
6(1866) L. R. 1 P. C. 328.
7(1880) 103 U. S. 168, 189, 26 L. Ed. 377.
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just commented, is much aid given to the doctrine, that this
power exists as one necessary to enable either house of Congress
to exercise successfully their function of legislation."
The power of the Houses of Congress through their commit-
tees to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of
papers is based entirely upon the powers delegated to them, or
necessarily incident thereto, by the constitution. Each house is
the judge of the election and qualification of its members and
may discipline them for improper behavior and likewise may con-
duct investigations for the furtherance of legislation. The House
of Representatives is empowered by the constitution to prefer
charges of impeachment and the Senate is required to try such
charges. For all these purposes there can be little doubt but that
each of the houses, or their committees properly empowered, may
compel the attendance of witnesses, require them to testify, and
require the production of pertinent papers.8 But neither house
can go beyond the jurisdiction thus conferred upon it and con-
duct a general inquest into the private affairs of any person. In
the Kilbourn Case the court says :'
"Whether the power of punishment in either House by fine
or imprisonment goes beyond this or not, we are sure that no
person can be punished for contuinacy as a witness before either
Hause, uiless his testimony is required in a matter into which
that House has jurisdiction to inquire, and we feel equally sure
that neither of these bodies possesses the general power of mak-
ing inquiry into the private affairs of the citizen."
The Court then discusses the constitutional division of powers
into the three grand departments, and states "as a general rule
the powers confided by the constitution to one of these depart-
ments cannot be exercised by another."10 In that case the Court
had before it the question of whether a warrant from the House
of Representatives to the sergeant-at-arms for the arrest and
commitment of one Kilbourn was protection to such officer in a
suit brought for false imprisonment against the sergeant-at-arms,
and others. It appears that a committee of the House had been
authorized by that body to investigate the "real estate pool" in
which Jay Cooke and Company were alleged to have a large
interest, and which company was heavily indebted to the United
States through the "improvidence" of the secretary of the navy.
There was obviously no purpose of legislation connected with
this investigation; Kilbourn was not an officer of the United
8In re Chapman, (1897) 166 U. S. 661, 41 L. Ed. 1154, 17 S. C. R. 677.
9(1880) 103 U. S. 168, 190, 26 L. Ed. 377.
10(1880) 103 U. S. 168, 191, 26 L. Ed. 377.
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States, and the House was not laying a foundation for impeach-
ment proceedings; so that the question was fairly presented as
to whether an investigation not within the powers granted by the
constitution might be conducted, witnesses subpoenaed, and pun-
ished for refusal to attend or testify. It was first contended
that the courts might not inquire into the legality of the proceed-
ings and the case of Anderson v. Dunn," was cited as authority.
The court distinguishes that case on the ground that the record
then before it did not show that the matter was outside of the
jurisdiction of the House. The Court in the Kilbourn Case finds
it necessary, however, to overrule some of the language used in
the Anderson Case and further states:
"But we do not concede that the Houses of Congress possess
this general power of punishing for contempt. The cases in
which they can do this are very limited, as we have already at-
tempted to show. If they are proceeding in a nmatter beyond
their legitiniuzte cognizance, we are of opinion that this can be
shown, and we cannot give our assent to the principle that, by
the mere act of asserting a person to be guilty of a contempt,
they thereby establish their right to fine and imprison him, beyond
the power of any court or any other tribunal whatever to inquire
into the grounds on which the order was made. .. .
And quoting from the case of Burnham v. Morrissey,12 as fol-
lows:
"The House of Representatives is not the final judge of its
own power and privileges in cases in which the rights and liber-
ties of the subject are concerned, but the legality of its action may
be examined and determined by this court. That house is not
the legislature, but only a part of it, and is therefore subject in
its actions to the laws, in common with all other bodies, officers,
and tribunals within the Commonwealth. Especially is it compe-
tent and proper for this court to consider whether its proceedings
are in conformity with the constitution and laws, because, living
under a written constitution, no branch or department of the
government is supreme; and it is the province and duty of the
judicial department to determine in cases regularly brought be-
fore them, whether the powers of any branch of the government,
and even those of the legislature in the enactment of laws, have
been exercised in conformity to the constitution; and if they
h -ve not, to treat their acts as null and void. The House of
Representatives has the power under the constitution to imprison
for, contempt; but the power is limited to cases expressly provided
for by the constitution, or to cases where the power is necessarily
implied from those 'constitutional functions and duties, to the
proper performance of which it is essential."
31(1821) 6 Wheat. (U.S.) 204, 5 L. Ed. 242.
12(1859) 14 Gray (Mass.) 226.
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The United States Supreme Court says: "In this statement
of the law, and in the principles there laid down, we fully concur."
In the case of In re Chapman,'3 the Court sustained the power
of Congress to compel the attendance of witnesses and their dis-
closure of evidence to enable the respective bodies to discharge
their legislative functions. Congress had passed an act' 4 in Janu-
ary, 1857, making it an indictable offense to refuse to comply
with a subpoena issued by either House. In that case the Senate
had sought to inquire into the conduct of such of its members as
might have been guilty of misbehavior in dealing in the stock of
a certain company engaged in the sugar business. The commit-
tees in charge of the investigation sought to prove by a broker
that members of the Senate had been dealing in sugar, through
the firm of which the broker was a member. He refused to dis-
close the names and proceedings were taken against him under
the statute to which he set up the defense of a lack of power on
the part of Congress to legislate along the lines above referred
to. The Court, however, sustained that power upon the theory
that the Senate had a right to inquire into the conduct of its own
members for disciplinary purposes. The opinion indicates plain-
ly, however, that should either House of Congress attempt to go
beyond its constitutional powers and inquire along lines outside
of those limits that such a showing would constitute a defense.
The opinion In re Pacific Railway Commission,7 contains
some very enlightening statements with reference to the consti-
tutional powers of Congress. The commission, authorized by
Congress to investigate the Pacific Railway, endeavored to com-
pel Leland Stanford to disclose his private affairs to that body.
This action brought from Judge Field the following language:
"Of all the rights of the citizen, few are of greater impor-
tance or more essential to his peace and happiness than the right
of personal security, and that involves, not merely protection of
his person from assault, but exemption of his private affairs,
books, and papers from the inspection and scrutiny of others.
Without the enjoyment of this right, all other rights would lose
half their value. The law provides for the compulsory produc-
tion, in the progress of judicial proceedings, or by direct suit for
that purpose, of such documents as affect the interest of others,
and also, in certain cases, for the seizure of criminating papers
necessary for the prosecution of offenders against public justice,
and only in one of these ways can they be obtained, and their
contents made known, against the will of the owners."'-6
13(1897) 166 U. S. 661, 41 L. Ed. 1154, 17 S. C. R. 677.
.411 Stat. at L. 155.
1"(1887) 12 Sawy. (U.S.C.C.) 559, 32 Fed. 241.
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And from Judge Sawyer, these words :17
". .. A general, roving, offensive, inquisitorial, compulsory
investigation, conducted by a commission without any allega-
tions, upon no fixed principles, and governed by no rules of law,
or of evidence, and no restrictions except its own will, or caprice,
is unknown to our constitution and laws; and such an inquisition
would be destructive of the rights of the citizen, and an intoler-
able tyranny. Let the power once be established and there is no
knowing, where the practice under it would end."
Judged by the rules laid down in the foregoing cases and in
many state cases which might be cited, some of the resolutions
upon which investigations are now being, or have recently been,
conducted in Congress may well be said to be vulnerable, and
not within the constitutional powers of Congress. Take, for
instance, the Senate resolution upon which the Daugherty inves-
tigation is founded and let it be understood that the writer holds
no brief for that gentleman. The resolution reads as follows:
"RESOLVED, That a committee of five Senators, consist-
ing of three members of the majority and two of the minority,
be authorized and directed to investigate circumstances and facts,
and report the same to the Senate, concerning the alleged failure
of Harry M. Daugherty, Attorney General of the United States,
to prosecute properly violators of the Sheiman Antitrust Act
and the Clayton Act against monopolies and unlawful restraint
of trade; the alleged neglect and failure of the said Harry M.
Daugherty, Attorney General of the United States, to arrest and
-prosecute Albert B, Fall, Harry F. Sinclair, E. L. Doheny, C. R.
Forbes, and their coconspirators in defrauding the Government
as well as the alleged neglect and failure of the said Attorney
General to arrest and prosecute properly, efficiently, and promptly
and defend all manner of civil and criminal actions wherein the
Government of the United States is interested as a party plaintiff
or defendant. And said committee is further directed to inquire
into, investigate, and report to the Senate the activities of the
said Harry M. Daugherty, Attorney General, and any of his
assistants in the Department of Justice which would in any man-
ner tend to impair their efficiency or influence as representatives
of the Government of the United States.
"That said committee above referred to and the chairman
thereof shall be elected by the Senate of the United States.
"RESOLVED FURTHER, that in pursuance of the pur-
poses of this resolution said committee or any member thereof
be, and hereby is, authorized during the sixty-eighth Congress
to send for persons, books, and papers; to administer oaths, and
'(In re Pacific Railway Commission, (1887) 12' Sawy. (U.S.C.C.)
559, 32 Fed. 241, 250.
171n re Pacific Railway Commission, (1887) 12 Sawy. (U.S.C.C.) 559,
32 Fed. 241, 263.
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to employ stenographic assistance at a cost not to exceed 25 cents
per hundred words, to report such hearings as may be had in
connection herewith, the expenses thereof to be paid out of the
contingent fund of the Senate, and that the committee, or any
sub-committee thereof, may sit during the sessions or recesses
of the Senate."' 8
It will be noted that no legislation is apparently contemplated;
nor is the information sought susceptible for use for the further-
ance of legislation. It is true that Harry M. Daugherty was,
until his recent resignation, a public officer of the United States
and had this resolution been passed by the House, it may be that
it would be sustainable under the powers which that House has
to prefer charges of impeachment. Undoubtedly the House of
Representatives may delegate to a committee the ascertainment
of facts upon which charges of impeachment may or may not
be preferred, and the investigation of any impeachable officer
for that purpose by such committee would undoubtedly be proper.
The Senate, however, is restricted to the trial of the charges
preferred by the House and may not, within its constitutional
powers, investigate for the purposes of preferring charges. That
is the exclusive privilege of the House of Representatives. Even
had the resolution contained a statement that the information so
obtained was to be used for the purpose of furthering legislation
it is doubtful whether any court would permit so obvious a pre-
text to sustain the resolution. In the case of People ex rel.
Sabold v. Webb,19 the resolution under consideration contained
the statement that the investigation was for the purpose of reme-
dial legislation; yet the court held that the mere statement in the
resolution could not change the obvious character of the investi-
gation which was an inquiry into the cost and profits made in the
erection of the State Capitol at Albany.
When the Daugherty committee organized, according to the
public press, it announced that it would not be controlled by rules
of evidence; that it would accept hearsay testimony and that the
right of cross-examination would be limited. It is interesting to
note Judge Field's remarks upon a similar -assertion by the Pacific
Railway Committee: He said :20
"... And yet, if the commissioners are not bound, as they
have asserted, by any rules of evidence in their investigations,
and may receive hearsay, ex parte statements, and information of
181talics are the author's.
'9(1889) 5 N. Y. S. 855.
20 1n re Pacific Railway Commission, (1887) 12 Sawy. (U.S.C.C.)
559, 32 Fed. 241, 257.
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every character that may be brought to their attention, and the
court is to aid them in this manner of investigation, there can be
no room for the exercise of judgment as to the propriety of the
questions asked, and the court is left merely to direct that the
.pleasure of the commissioners in the line of their inquiries be
carried out."
Nor would it be proper for a legislature to conduct an inves-
tigation for the purpose of vindicating or condoning some public
official. In Ex parte Caldwell, the court says :21
". .. It would be a very remarkable spectacle, indeed, for
Congress and Legislatures of the states to conduct investiga-
tions for vindication purposes, at the expense of the people, in
every instance where, in the heat of partisan debate, some charge
of misconduct, malfeasance, or violation of law, is made against
a public official, and extend such vindicatory investigation to
such officials after they have filled their terms of office and passed
into private life."
"... It is true generally, as contended for, that all infer-
ences are to be made and all doubts solved in favor of the legiti-
macy of the legislative purpose and action, but not when it ex-
pressly appears by the act itself, in positive terms, that its purpose
is illegitimate and contrary to constitutional limitations." 2
This case was subsequently reversed by the Supreme Court on
the ground of want of federal jurisdiction only.22 The views of
members of Congress who believe that Congressional power is
only limited by Congressional discretion are well set out in a
speech of Honorable John J. McSwain of South Carolina, deliv-
ered in the House of Representatives, April 18, 1924.24 Mr. Mc-
Swain did not discuss the effect of the fourth amendment on his
doctrine, nor did-he discuss the history of congressional powers




From the foregoing cases it is apparent that neither the
National Legislature nor either House thereof has the right,
in conducting these investigations, to go beyond the powers dele-
gated to it by the constitution for the discipline or expulsion of
members, for impeachment purposes, or for determining whether
members were elected or qualified; and in furtherance of legisla-
21(1905) 138 Fed. 487, 495.
22(1905) 138 Fed. 487, 496.
23Carfer v. Caldwell, (1906) 200 U. S. 293, 50 L. Ed. 488, 26 S. C. R.
264. A very interesting and instructive note on this subject is contained in
40 Ann. Cas. 1055 where the federal, state and English cases are collected.24Congressional Record, 68th Cong., 1st sess., page 6915.
25(1880) 103 U. S. 168, 26 L. Ed. 377.
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tion. Measured by these rules, the above quoted resolution is
beyond the powers of the Senate, and the demand made by the
committee in furtherance of that resolution for the inspection
and delivery of files from the attorney general's office and the
compulsion of witnesses, would appear to be entirely unenforce-
able. Other resolutions are before, the Senate upon which investi-
gations are being conducted and in two instances at least the
authority of the Senate has been challenged in the courts.
